Political scientists' response to Barack Obama's election in 2008 as the first African American president of the United States has focused on a theme that has long prevailed in the study of race and politics: how racial prejudice influences the votes of whites (e.g., Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Pasek et al. 2009; Piston 2010; Tessler and Sears 2010) . In doing so, scholars have largely overlooked the fact that the 2008 campaign featured months of wall-to-wall coverage of Obama and his family that firmly contradicted negative stereotypes associating blacks with laziness, crime, and fatherless families-even in coverage that originated from sources ideologically opposed to Obama's candidacy. As such, the campaign can be seen as a rare instance in which whites were massively exposed to a clear positive shift in the balance of black exemplars in mass media. The 2008 campaign thus provides an opportunity to look for evidence of mediated intergroup contact: the phenomenon in which media acts as a point of virtual contact between ingroup and outgroup members, and prejudice is reduced in a way similar to face-to-face contact.
Using three waves of nationally representative panel survey data collected during the campaign, I show that the Obama campaign produced a significant and substantive decline in white racial prejudice. In the period between July 2008 and January 2009, the "Obama Effect" reduced racial prejudice by a rate that was at least five times faster than the secular trend of decline in prejudice occurring in the United States over the previous two decades. In addition, these data permit fixed effects analyses of within-person change-that is, an assessment of the impact of change in mediated exposure to Obama on change in racial prejudice at the individual level-a technique which provides the strongest possible causal evidence short of an experiment (Allison 2009 ). Thus the evidence offered here is much more compelling and detailed than that provided by the only study using nationally representative samples to examine the "Obama Effect," which relies on aggregate data collected only once every four years (Welch and Sigelman 2011) .
With this powerful design, I am able to thoroughly document these effects as well as investigate the mechanisms of influence. Consistent with the theory, racial prejudice declined gradually during the campaign as exposure to Obama increased. Moreover, counter to conventional wisdom in political science-but consistent with the theory-exposure had the greatest impact among McCain supporters. Although these individuals resisted Obama's political message, the passive psychological process underlying exemplification limits resistance to counter-stereotypical portrayals. In fact, Obama countered their expectations of blacks far more than among liberals, who had more positive preexisting images of blacks. Finally, even exposure to conservative programs that criticized Obama's politics reduced prejudice because they incidentally portrayed him as countering negative racial stereotypes.
Mediated Intergroup Contact
Mediated intergroup contact theory builds on a large literature on the beneficial effects of face-to-face intergroup contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) . Recent evidence has revealed similar effects from indirect contact, in which simply knowing that a friend is friends with an outgroup member or observing a positive outgroup exemplar on a television screen improved intergroup attitudes (Wright et al. 1997; Mutz and Goldman 2010) . Research on human-media interaction further underlines the potential for media to act as an important point of contact, in that people psychologically process televised portrayals as if they were first-hand observations (Reeves and Nass 1996) .
Although most studies examining the impact of media exposure on prejudice have relied on cross-sectional surveys that provide weak causal evidence (e.g., Dixon 2008; Gross 1984; Vidmar and Rokeach 1974) , a small number of experiments have shown that mediated exposure to positive outgroup exemplars, including blacks, can decrease prejudice (Ford 1997; Power, Murphy, and Coover 1996; Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005) . Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether evidence from laboratory studies generalizes to more naturalistic settings (Mutz and Goldman 2010) .
Exposure to mass media is assumed to influence levels of prejudice by altering the balance of positive and negative black exemplars, that is, through exemplification (Zillmann and Brosius 2000). According to this framework, attitudes about social groups are based on the individual group members, or exemplars, at the "top of mind" (Smith and Zarate 1992) .
Consistent with this idea, several studies have demonstrated that recent and short-term exposure to counter-stereotypical outgroup exemplars reduces prejudice (Bodenhausen et al. 1995; Dasgupta and Greenwald 2001; Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji 2003) .
During the 2008 campaign, the massive amount of coverage of Obama clearly altered the balance of positive and negative black exemplars in mass media in a positive direction, swamping coverage of stereotypical exemplars of blacks during this period. The result should be a simultaneous decline in white racial prejudice. Nonetheless, prior evidence of an "Obama Effect" is extremely limited. The only study using nationally representative samples relied on separate surveys to show a positive shift in aggregate levels of racial prejudice from 2004 to 2008 (Welch and Sigelman 2011) . Three other surveys were carried out during the campaign, but they all used convenience samples (Bernstein, Young, and Claypool 2010; Plant et al. 2009; Schmidt and Nosek 2010) . Finally, an experiment conducted long after the campaign found that showing college students Obama's name reduced racial prejudice relative to those shown the names of three disliked black exemplars (Columb and Plant 2011) . In sum, prior research suggests that an "Obama Effect" is plausible, but none have (a) demonstrated that racial prejudice declined during the campaign among the general population; (b) linked exposure to Obama with changes in racial prejudice; or (c) investigated the mechanisms of these effects.
Although I have emphasized the immense quantity of coverage of Obama, the nature of coverage matters as well, though not in the way political scientists usually assume. Regardless of the tone of political coverage, mediated contact is expected to reduce prejudice so long as media portray counter-stereotypical outgroup exemplars. This was undoubtedly the case across the media spectrum during the campaign. Even conservative programs that harshly criticized Obama's politics nonetheless portrayed him as countering negative racial stereotypes.
Subtyping as a Rival Theoretical Framework
Subtyping predicts little to no change in racial prejudice due to whites dismissing Obama as an exception to prevailing racial stereotypes (Brown and Hewstone 2005; Brewer, Dull, and Lui 1981) . "'There are nice Negroes but . . . or some of my best friends are Jews but . . . by excluding a few favored cases, the negative rubric is kept intact for all other cases" (Allport 1954: 23 ). Yet, several experimental studies have demonstrated that exposure to counterstereotypical outgroup members can reduce prejudice (Bodenhausen et al. 1995; Gurwitz and Dodge 1977; Weber and Crocker 1983) . In fact, intergroup contact should cause the largest reductions in prejudice among those for whom the exemplar most strongly counters their expectations; that is, those with higher initial levels of prejudice (Maoz 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) . Research on "extremity bias" has found that people are often more influenced by novel information that strongly contrasts with their expectations (Fiske 1980; Carlston 1987, 1989 ).
Mediated intergroup contact should be particularly likely to reduce prejudice among those with higher levels of initial prejudice because exemplification operates without deliberative processing, thus reducing the potential for resistance. For example, only when people were forewarned not to be influenced by atypical exemplars did exposure to highly successful black exemplars like Michael Jordan or Oprah Winfrey fail to improve attitudes toward blacks (Bodenhausen et al. 1995) . Thus, although Republicans and conservatives undoubtedly resisted Obama's political message, the images of Obama still refuted negative racial stereotypes implicitly. In fact, because these groups have higher levels of initial prejudice, "extremity bias" suggests that they should exhibit the largest reductions in prejudice (above and beyond regression to the mean) because Obama countered their expectations about blacks far more than those with more positive expectations.
Research Design
The data for this study come from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Study's five- 
Measuring Racial Prejudice
Definitions of prejudice vary widely, but they share the idea of favoring one's own ingroup over an outgroup, that is, ingroup favoritism (Brown and Zagefka 2005) . Nonetheless, immense controversy surrounds the operationalization of racial prejudice in surveys (Huddy and Feldman 2009 higher levels of ingroup favoritism).
Measuring Exposure to Obama
How might whites have been exposed to the Obama exemplar? Relatively few had faceto-face contact with the campaign, or even attended a political rally. However, millions of Americans had repeated exposure to Obama via mass media. Thus, I rely on three operationalizations of mediated exposure to Obama: Political Interest, Self-Perceived Knowledge about Obama, and most importantly, the Number of Political Television Shows Viewed (see Appendix A for details).
One prominent approach to measuring media exposure assesses political awareness, which is typically measured as Political Interest (e.g., Huber and Arceneaux 2007) . Thus, at three points in time, respondents were asked how interested they were in political and public affairs. In addition, in an effort to assess campaign exposure to Obama specifically, I rely on a measure of Self-Perceived Knowledge about Obama, for which respondents were asked, at three points in time, how much they felt they knew about Obama.
A third measure comes closest to tapping exposure, without risking the potential endogeneity of self-reported exposure to Obama. Respondents were asked, at three points in time, whether they regularly viewed each of 49 television programs that were selected because they were the most widely watched programs with campaign-related content; they ranged from nightly network news to newsmagazines to talk shows to opinion programs. The variable is a count of the Number of Political TV Shows Viewed. All three exposure measures were scaled to range from 0 to 1.
Each exposure measure has strengths and weaknesses. Political Interest avoids the pitfalls associated with efforts to directly measure exposure to political television, yet it is a relatively diffuse measure of exposure to Obama specifically.
Self-Perceived Knowledge about
Obama benefits from asking about Obama specifically, but it relies on respondents' subjective perceptions; at the same time, within-person change in Self-Perceived Knowledge about Obama (and Political Interest) should go hand-in-hand with change in exposure.
Still, the best measure of exposure to Obama is the Number of Political TV Shows Viewed. Dilliplane et al.'s (2012) analysis of three waves of national representative panel data found that this measure has a true-score reliability of .83, which is better than the estimated truescore reliabilities for common measures of other key political constructs, such as presidential job approval and issue preferences (Bartels 1993). Moreover, the measure exhibited high levels of predictive validity, predicting change over time in campaign-specific knowledge. Finally, this measure showed strong discriminant validity, predicting recognition of candidate faces far better than exposure to less visual media sources.
To assess whether the partisan leaning of coverage mattered above and beyond the sheer amount of coverage, I follow Dilliplane (2011) To investigate the impact of exposure to Obama, I employ fixed effects models of withinperson change, which use strictly within-person variance, comparing each respondent to him or herself at an earlier point in time. As a result, the constant effects of individual characteristics (whether observable or unobservable) cannot produce spurious associations (Allison 2009 ). This represents a huge improvement over most observational studies, which rely on potentially contaminated between-person variance. Even most panel designs, including lagged dependent variable models and random effects models (i.e., multi-level models), use between-person variance (Allison 1990 ). Fixed effects regression automatically eliminates the impact of all preexisting differences, such as differences in education or political interest. And by including variables representing each wave of the survey, I am efficiently control for the general over-time trend in prejudice that is unrelated to the campaign. 5 Fixed effects regression arguably provides the most rigorous causal test outside of experiments (Allison 2009 ).
Results

Trends in White Racial Prejudice during the 2008 Campaign
5 ∆ = ∆ + 1 ∆ + 2 ∆ + ∆ Figure 1 shows aggregate levels of prejudice by randomized date of interview, combining the three survey waves into a single time-series. Little change occurred in July and August of 2008, but starting in mid-September, a decline in prejudice began, and continued with only minor interruptions through the end of the campaign in early November. Prejudice declined slightly more in the two months after the election.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Using a fixed effects model of within-person change, Table 1 confirms that White Racial
Prejudice declined significantly over time. As shown in column 1, both the wave 4 and 5 dummy variables indicate a significant decline in prejudice. Specifically, the coefficient of -1.07
(p<.001) for the wave 4 dummy variable indicates that prejudice declined, on average, by about one point from wave 3 to 4; and the coefficient of -2.08 (p<.001) for the wave 5 dummy variable indicates that prejudice declined, on average, by about two points from wave 3 to 5 (N = 2,636).
[ Table 1 about here]
Although it is clear that White Racial Prejudice declined, it is unclear if this is because whites evaluated blacks more favorably by the end of the campaign, or whites less favorably. If mediated intergroup contact theory is correct, and exposure to Obama caused whites to change their attitudes toward blacks as a group, then the decline in racial prejudice should result primarily from change in attitudes toward blacks. Consistent with this expectation, the fixed effects model of within-person change in column 2 of Table 1 shows a significant positive change in attitudes toward blacks from wave 3 to 5 (1.74, p<.001), while column 2 shows that attitudes toward whites did not change from wave 3 to 5 (-.09, p=.79).
Racial prejudice declined during the campaign, but was this change large or small by historical standards-that is, relative to recent secular trends? 6 To answer this question, I
compared the extent of change in prejudice during the 2008 campaign with the year-to-year fluctuations historically on the General Social Surveys (GSS) and the American National Election Studies (ANES), both of which included the measure of racial prejudice used in this study (since 1990 and 1992, respectively) . 7 Because the response scales differ, I rely on standardized prejudice scores. 8 Given that the NAES covered a six-month period, I calculated the amount of change per six-month period on the ANES and GSS; that is, I calculated the absolute value of the differences between each pair of adjacent surveys, summed the differences, and then divided by the number of six-month periods covered by each time series.
As shown in Figure 2, was dramatic, reducing racial prejudice by a rate between five and 14 times faster than the secular trend of decline in prejudice over the previous two decades.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The Impact of Exposure to Obama
Can the decline in racial prejudice during the 2008 campaign be linked to change over time in individuals' exposure to Obama? If exposure to Obama as a positive black exemplar produced these changes, then one should see greater declines in prejudice among those whose political television exposure increased the most. Table 2 [ Table 2 about here]
To provide an additional test of this hypothesis that does not rely on self-reports, I
utilized variation between states in the amount of television advertising by the Obama campaign.
If exposure to Obama contributed to the decline in racial prejudice, then whites living in states with more advertising by Obama should have experienced larger reductions in prejudice.
Although detailed data on television advertising spending by media market is prohibitively expensive, estimates of advertising spending by state are publicly available. 9 I categorize states into the Top 25 and Bottom 25 in advertising spending, though I find similar results using alternative categorizations. I also find the same pattern comparing states according to those classified as "battleground" to "non-battleground" by news media, even though this only indirectly taps the extent of advertising.
10
Figure 3 presents levels of racial prejudice by amount of television advertising spending by the Obama campaign. Because campaign advertising concludes by Election Day, Figure 3 shows the trend in prejudice from waves 3 to 4, excluding the post-election wave. As shown in [ Table 3 about here]
One did not need to support Obama in order for prejudice to decline, but did the partisanship of media coverage still condition whether exposure to Obama led to reductions in racial prejudice? The theory as formulated suggests that the impact of exposure to Obama should not depend upon the political tone of coverage because even harshly negative coverage of Obama nonetheless portrayed him as hardworking rather than lazy, as well-educated and intelligent, and as a family man rather than a violent criminal. Thus, even exposure to Obama via conservative-leaning television programs should produce declines in racial prejudice.
In order to test this hypothesis, I examine whether the partisan slant of programs mattered above and beyond the sheer number of political programs viewed. 
Social Desirability
The primary alternative explanation for my findings is that exposure to Obama caused whites to give increasingly socially desirable responses over the course of the campaign in order to avoid looking racist. Based on a variety of reasons, however, this appears unlikely. To start, fully 56 percent of whites showed favoritism for whites over blacks on wave 3, suggesting little aversion to answering in a way that indicates ingroup favoritism. This is probably because this measure did not require whites to directly compare whites to blacks. Instead, whites evaluated their own group and several minutes later (or earlier) evaluated blacks (with the order randomized).
Additionally, there are often social desirability effects in response to racial attitude questions in face-to-face and telephone surveys (e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kuklinski et al. 1997) , such effects are less common with Internet surveys (Chang and Krosnick 2009; Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008; Pasek et al. 2009 ). Nonetheless, as another check, I used the randomized order of the items about whites and blacks to examine whether whites changed their second group evaluation to come closer to the first one in an effort to rate the groups equally. If social desirability was changing their responses, then whites should have evaluated their own 14 This was not due to conservatives being the primary viewers of conservative programs, as there were no significant interactions between the partisan media exposure variables and individual political ideology. Perhaps, as "extremity bias" suggests, coverage of a positive black exemplar was seen as more unexpected on conservative programs.
ingroup less positively when blacks were asked about first (in order to shift closer to a putatively lower evaluation of the outgroup). Similarly, whites should have evaluated blacks more positively when their own ingroup was asked about first (in order to shift closer to a putatively higher evaluation of the ingroup). In neither case, however, was the pattern consistent with social desirability, nor did this pattern change over time.
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As yet another check, I examined the decline in prejudice by level of education. Many have argued that that the higher-educated are more sensitive to social norms against prejudice (e.g., Kuklinski and Cobb 1998; Jackman and Muha 1984; Krysan 1998) . Social desirability thus predicts that higher-educated whites should have exhibited larger declines in racial prejudice and little or no change among the lower-educated. However, Figure 4 shows that racial prejudice declined significantly more among whites with lower levels of education. 16 In other words, racial prejudice declined the most among those who are the least sensitive to social norms.
[ Figure 4 about here] 16 A fixed effects model revealed a significant interaction between education and the wave 5 dummy variable (.22, p<.05) . This is unlikely to be due to a ceiling effect as the higher-educated exhibited a substantial amount of prejudice on all three survey waves.
same questions in a later wave. Yet the number of prior survey waves that whites participated in had no effect on levels of racial prejudice.
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Discussion
Taken together, the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that exposure to the 2008 campaign helped to reduce white racial prejudice. Levels of prejudice declined gradually during the campaign due to a positive shift in whites' attitudes toward blacks, rather than a negative shift in attitudes toward whites. Further, despite their individual strengths and weaknesses, change over time corresponding to all three operationalizations of exposure to Obama significantly predicted change in racial prejudice at the individual level. Finally, although exposure occurred primarily through national television programs, additional exposure in states with an influx of television advertising by Obama led to further reductions in racial prejudice.
Despite the consistency of these findings, one potential concern is that alternative measures of racial prejudice, such as measures of "implicit" prejudice or racial resentment, would not produce the same conclusions. However, implicit racial prejudice had no impact on vote choice in the 2008 election after controlling for explicit racial prejudice (Pasek et al. 2009 ).
And a laboratory experiment conducted after the campaign found that exposure to Obama's name reduced implicit racial prejudice (Columb and Plant 2011) . Racial resentment, for its part, is strongly correlated with the measure of racial prejudice used in this study (Kinder and Sanders 17 Using OLS regression predicting wave 5 prejudice, I found a non-significant effect of the number of prior waves that the respondent had participated in that included the prejudice items(-.30, p = .18, N = 14,229). The analysis controlled for the number of months that each respondent had been on the Knowledge Networks panel and demographic and political variables.
1996). A recent study by Valentino and Brader (2011) might appear to contradict my findings, but in fact their results reinforce my own, despite the much shorter time frame of their panel (fielded immediately before and after the election). Although racial resentment increased among the third of their sample who perceived less discrimination against blacks, there was a significant decline in racial resentment among the white sample as a whole.
Before contemplating the implications of my findings, I first consider two threats to interpreting these relationships as causal: spuriousness and reverse causality. In most observational studies, spuriousness arising from individual differences is a serious concern, but fixed effects regression compares each respondent to him-or herself, thus controlling for the constant effects of all individual characteristics (Allison 2009 ).
The only other route through which spuriousness could result is from variables that changed over time. 18 To control for this possibility all of the models included variables representing each wave of the survey in order to efficiently capture the sum-total effects of all other variables that changed during the campaign, as well as any impact of a long-term secular trend in prejudice that preceded the campaign. Moreover, one is hard-pressed to find timevarying factors that could have simultaneously caused both over-time increases in political television exposure and over-time declines in racial prejudice. 19 There would have to be some third force that caused both increases in political interest and decreases in racial prejudice, as well as explain why changes in exposure had a greater impact in states with more Obama advertising. Finally, prior research shows that this measure of exposure has high levels of truescore reliability, predictive validity, and discriminant validity (Dilliplane, Goldman, and Mutz 2012) .
Beyond spuriousness, the remaining threat to validity is reverse causality due to selective exposure. Selective exposure predicts that whites who disliked Obama and had higher levels of preexisting prejudice would avoid exposure to Obama, resulting in no change in racial prejudice.
On the contrary, racial prejudice declined the most among whites with higher levels of preexisting racial prejudice, including McCain supporters, conservatives, and Republicans.
A final concern stems from panel attrition, though it does not appear to have been a problem in this study. Whites who remained in the panel for all three waves had somewhat lower levels of racial prejudice on the initial wave than whites who dropped out (M=8. 16 and M=9.18, p=.06) . Given that prejudice declined more among those with higher levels of initial prejudice, my analyses likely underestimated the size of the decline in prejudice.
Implications
With few exceptions, public opinion researchers treat racial prejudice "as a fixed personal attribute" (Paluck and Green 2009: 343) , yet exposure to the 2008 campaign led to reductions in racial prejudice. To be sure, racial prejudice remains prevalent in American society, and continues to influence mass political behavior. At the same time, the overall decline in racial prejudice of about two points is large relative to the secular trend in racial prejudice over the last two decades. In fact, the best estimate of the impact of exposure suggests a much larger decline of about nine points; and this effect is even larger-about 18 points-among whites who disliked Obama's politics and had negative preexisting images of blacks.
These findings are consistent with mediated intergroup contact, which predicted larger effects among those for whom a positive black exemplar is more unexpected. 20 Also consistent 20 Importantly, this pattern was not due to regression to the mean, which would imply random fluctuations between each pair of waves. Between waves 3 and 4, this would mean a decrease in prejudice among those with high initial levels of prejudice and an increase in prejudice among those with low initial levels of prejudice; between waves 4 and 5, the two groups should have either showed no change or reverted back toward their initial values. But instead of these random fluctuations, a systematic pattern emerged: those with high initial levels of prejudice exhibited consistent declines in prejudice; even those with low initial levels of prejudice exhibited small declines. Moreover, I found a systematic influence of exposure to Obama, especially among those with high initial levels of prejudice.
with the theory is the significant impact of conservative programs, which criticized Obama but still included innumerable portrayals contradicting racial stereotypes. Finally, exposure to Obama via televised advertising led to further declines in prejudice.
To be sure, these findings support the hypothesized theoretical mechanism indirectly, though a recent experiment has demonstrated the plausibility of the exemplar-based account (Columb and Plant 2011) . In order to pinpoint which aspect of campaign coverage was responsible for racial prejudice declining during the campaign, future research could combine content analyses of campaign coverage with individual-level measures of media exposure.
Of course, a key remaining question is the duration of the "Obama Effect." According to the theory, changes in racial prejudice should move in concert with changes in the balance of black exemplars in mass media. What matters is recent "top of mind" exposure, so if the amount of exposure to Obama changes, then so should levels of racial prejudice. This account is consistent with a growing body of research documenting important yet fleeting effects of mass media (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2010; Gerber et al. 2011; Mutz and Reeves 2005) . In the case of Obama, aggregate levels of exposure have probably declined since the election due to there being less political coverage of him and less public attention to political coverage. The likely result is an overall increase in levels of racial prejudice. At the same time, racial prejudice should decline still further among individuals with continued ongoing exposure to the Obama exemplar. Note: In order to confirm that racial prejudice declined more among whites living in the top 25 states in television advertising spending by the Obama campaign, I conducted a fixed effects analysis predicting within-person change in white racial prejudice from the wave 4 dummy variable (with wave 3 as the excluded reference category) and its interaction with a dummy variable where 1 equals living in one of the top 25 states in Obama advertising and 0 equals living in one of the bottom 25 states in Obama advertising. The analysis showed a negative and significant interaction (-1.04, p<.05, N = 2,627). Note: The table presents unstandardized fixed effects regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. All of the independent variables range from 0 to 1. Each model also includes the order in which the racial groups were asked about. ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 #p<.10
